New security threats and a crisis of acceptance in the wake of defunding.

 

The steep reductions in humanitarian programming following the defunding have altered the security landscape for aid agencies, exposing new vulnerabilities and amplifying existing ones. In many contexts, the abrupt withdrawal of services has created resentment among affected people, while downsizing has increased exposure for the organisations and individuals that remain. These dynamics are compounded by the erosion of acceptance – driven in part by harmful narratives, misinformation, and disinformation – that is increasingly shaping threat perceptions and behaviours towards aid actors.

Rising tensions following abrupt closures and loss of vital services 

Provisional data for 2025 includes a small number of major security incidents with evidence of a direct link to defunding-related programme closures or downsizing. The true number is likely higher; many local organisations are unwilling to report such incidents, and others fall outside AWSD’s inclusion criteria because no aid worker was killed, seriously injured, or abducted/detained for more than 24 hours. Other data gatherers and interviewees spoke of assaults, vehicle robberies, break-ins, protests, and other acts often attributed to disgruntled former employees or aggrieved community members – only some of which were formally reported. Interviewees described a range of flashpoints: terminated staff staging protests or office confrontations, alleged break-ins by former employees, vendors demanding payment at gunpoint, and desperate HIV patients protesting after their health services ceased. In rural areas, confusion and misinformation about funding cuts have fuelled community suspicions that aid agencies are “wasting” or stealing money. Armed groups have exploited these grievances – particularly in the far northwest and northeast of Sudan – to block access and consolidate control. National NGOs stressed that the loss of presence erodes the “mutual protection” that comes from sustained engagement, leaving both communities and humanitarians more exposed. The effects extend beyond direct security incidents. In some contexts, the abrupt halt of projects – such as protection services, accompaniment and community outreach – has removed vital stabilising factors. The closure of remote aid distribution sites in Nigeria has prompted increased displacement as people travel for services, which non-state armed groups have taken as an opportunity to expand the territories they control. In parts of the Sahel and CAR, governments have fed anti-international NGO narratives into pre-existing mistrust, and in eastern DRC, some organisations have taken on higher operational risks to secure scarce funding, pushing beyond their usual risk thresholds under donor pressure to “do more with less”.

Loss of acceptance, amplified by misinformation

 The funding crisis has not only diminished operational capacity, it has also fuelled a crisis of acceptance in many contexts. Longstanding harmful narratives – depicting aid agencies as foreign-controlled,politically motivated, or even aligned with belligerents – have been reinforced and, in some cases,deliberately weaponised. Social media sentiment analysis by Insecurity Insight in the Sahel and DRC found that the crisis has been used to bolster existing claims that humanitarian assistance is a tool of Western control or “colonialism”, and to perpetuate accusations that agencies support terrorist  

organisations.8 According to Insecurity Insight, these narratives often circulate in politically charged environments, making it difficult to distinguish between organically held beliefs and manufactured content amplified by influencers or political actors. Disparaging statements by members of the US government have been exploited by local authorities and other groups suspicious of or hostile to international aid and repeated in incidents of harassment described by interviewees. According to a former USAID official, a hostile government official reportedly remarked to an aid representative, “If your president says you’re a criminal, why shouldn’t I arrest you right now?” In Sudan, Yemen, and parts of the Sahel, misinformation at the community level has led to hostility and access denial. Residents, unaware of the external funding context, sometimes assume that aid workers are misusing or withholding resources. Armed groups have exploited these perceptions to obstruct operations and consolidate control, particularly in contested rural areas. Social media has become a key vector for mis-and disinformation involving humanitarian actors. In one DRC incident documented by Insecurity Insight, a stolen x-ray machine appeared online alongside false claims that the agency had supplied it to an armed group. Although causality is hard to prove, the aid worker later killed in the region was described in online comments as having “deserved it”. Similar online attacks have included negative campaigning against specific agencies and ridicule of dismissed aid workers as engaged in “woke” or non-essential activities. Faced with these pressures, many agencies opt not to respond publicly, fearing further exposure. However, as Insecurity Insight notes, this silence can cede ground to hostile narratives and make it harder to reclaim humanitarian space once lost. Compounding the problem, public communications often default to overly diplomatic or vague language, which audiences may perceive as evasive. Interviewees stressed that clearer, more precise messaging – paired with direct community engagement – is essential to counter misinformation and sustain acceptance in an increasingly contested operational environment.9

Data loss and ‘de-professionalisation

For years, USAID has been one of the largest single investors in humanitarian data, funding a wide range of systems that underpin crisis response – from famine early warning and public health surveillance to displacement tracking, needs assessments, and operational security analysis. These systems have become increasingly interdependent, designed to share information and avoid duplication. As a result, the sudden withdrawal of USAID funding in early 2025 has not only jeopardised individual data streams but also exposed the sector’s vulnerability to cascading collapse, where the loss of one stream degrades the effectiveness of others in guiding decisions, allocating resources, and forecasting risks.10 In terms of aid worker security, prior to January 2025, every major collector of security incident data worldwide received some form of funding or technical assistance from USAID. The extent of the effects of defunding on this data remains to be seen, but defunding has begun to shutter organisations that have served for years as primary sources of incident reporting in insecure contexts. Third-party humanitarian data organisations that produce analysis to inform decision makers face the greatest risk of closure as other donors scramble to decide what can be saved.11 While some initially defunded programmes, such as FEWS NET, have secured alternative support, the scale of USAID’s prior role makes it unlikely that all the security data streams will survive.

De-professionalisation

The contraction of the sector has given rise to trends of de-professionalisation across numerous areas, including security risk management. As support service providers such as INSO reduce their operations, and as organisations lose internal security training capacity, coordination forums in some countries are starting to pool resources and run their own ad hoc security functions. While this demonstrates initiative and a sense of solidarity, it also signals a return to fragmented, inconsistent practices and risks the loss of institutional knowledge that has accumulated over many years. Organisations have prioritised maintaining field presence by cutting HQ and regional posts first, but this has still resulted in the loss of in-country security positions, including trainers and ‘training-of-trainers’ roles. An NGO senior staffer noted that staff movement – ideally a healthy exchange between organisations – has shifted toward a one-way flow out of the NGOs, with experienced practitioners leaving for better-resourced UN agencies or, increasingly, the private sector. Several interviewees cited the departure of top security specialists to banking and other corporate roles, motivated by the need for career stability. This brain drain, alongside the loss of security positions, not only erodes operational security but also reverses more than a decade of gains in professionalising humanitarian security.